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 Poverty and citizenship: sociological perspectives on water services 
and public-private participation 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article focuses on the arguments used to support private sector participation 
(PSP) in the provision of water and sanitation services (WSS) since the 1980s. It 
addresses the following questions: what was the historical evidence informing the 
claim that promoting PSP would be the best instrument for reducing water poverty? 
What are the principles that provided the foundation for this claim? And, what has 
been the empirical record of the resulting WSS policies? It argues that early 
neoliberal WSS policies since the 1980s were not intended to expand services to the 
poor. A pro-poor rhetoric was added to these policies since the 1990s, probably as a 
result of increasing citizen unrest in developing countries and the failure of 
privatized WSS projects in the Americas and Europe. However, the claim that PSP 
can provide the solution to public sector failure in extending coverage of essential 
WSS to the poor has little ground both in the theoretical literature and in the 
historical record. As it could have been expected from the accumulated knowledge 
about the relationship between market-driven WSS and the poor, the recent 
experience with PSP projects has been disappointing. In practice these policies not 
only have failed to extend these essential services to the poor but have also 
contributed to deepening existing inequalities of power resulting in the weakening of 
state, local government, and civil society capacities to exercise democratic control 
over private water monopolies in most developing countries. Reversing this 
imbalance is one of the crucial challenges ahead in order to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals. However, the article argues that the inertial forces set in motion 
by the neoliberal model of water policy based on market-centred governance of 
water and WSS remains the crucial obstacle for the achievement of the goals. 
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 Poverty and citizenship: sociological perspectives on water services 
and public-private participation 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Although extending the coverage of water and sanitation services (WSS) to the poor 
was not among the stated goals of the programmes promoting private sector 
participation (PSP) in this area of activity, since the mid 1990s mainstream water 
policies1 increasingly adopted a pro-poor rhetoric. This paper explores the arguments 
and the empirical ground on which these policies have been predicated from a 
sociological perspective that focuses on the processes of governance and citizenship 
in relation to water. After two decades of relentless policy programmes oriented at 
fostering PSP in WSS, there is now an increasing –though partial and half hearted– 
recognition that the expected outcomes have not materialized. Moreover, the 
evidence suggests that these policies based on the commodification of water 
resources and WSS2 may be intimately related to the increasing inequality that has 
been recorded in developing countries since the 1990s, particularly in Latin America, 
which is consistent with other analyses (cf. Stiglitz, 2002: 79). Moreover, although 
mainstream WSS policies were supposed to enhance democratic governance and 
citizenship in a sector of activity characterized by top-down and paternalistic 
practices, they have actually reinforced existing power asymmetries and further 
deepened the alienation of common citizens. 
There are, though, some caveats that need to be spelled out before entering 
the discussion. In the first place, our critique of mainstream PSP policies does not 
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overlook the need to simultaneously criticize past and present public sector failures 
in the WSS sector. In fact, there is a close interdependence between public and 
private participation in WSS, although this is often obscured in current debates. 
Nevertheless, in this particular article we specifically examine the claim that public 
sector failure to extend coverage of essential WSS to the poor in developing 
countries will be solved by expanding PSP, an argument that has been put forward to 
justify mainstream WSS policies. Secondly, although our research has concentrated 
on cases involving multinational private water monopolies (MPWMs),3 which are 
the main actors of the mainstream model, we do not reduce PSP in WSS to this 
particular form. Therefore, the ensuing discussion should not be taken as applicable 
to all possible forms of private, in the sense of not state-led, involvement.4 Having 
said this, our analysis is justified because the policy of water commodification based 
on the expansion of MPWMs has been at the core of mainstream pro-poor aid, 
investment, and development programmes since the 1980s. Any balance of these 
policies and any analysis of future scenarios need to address this particular form of 
PSP owing to its far-reaching consequences for the democratic governance of water 
resources and WSS and for the achievement of WSS universalization as envisaged in 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).5 The paper argues that, although there 
is an increasing recognition, at least rhetorical, that neoliberal WSS policies have 
failed to achieve the expected results, the inertial forces set in motion since the 1980s 
will continue to shape institutional reforms and policy decisions that deepen rather 
than reduce WSS inequality and poverty6, especially in less developed countries. 
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The first section reviews the arguments put forward to back the claim that 
private sector expansion would help to extend the access of WSS to the poor.  We 
make here a provisional evaluation of these claims, in the light of the historical and 
empirical evidence. Then, we examine in the second section the implications of the 
mainstream model for the democratic governance of WSS, exploring what we call 
the neoliberal utopia of establishing a market-centered model of governance. We 
summarize in this section some examples from ongoing research in Latin America 
and Europe. The third section briefly reviews recent developments and changes in 
mainstream policies, which derive from the belated and half-hearted recognition of 
what we consider an evident failure of the mainstream policies. 
 
The private sector as champion of the poor 
 
Helping the poor or reducing poverty were not among the key targets of early 
privatization programmes in the 1980s. For instance, in Vickers and Yarrow’s (1988) 
seminal economic analysis of the British privatization programme the concepts of 
poverty or the poor were notoriously absent. Even in the early 1990s, when 
privatization policies were rapidly expanding in developing and transition countries 
and their original objectives had come to encompass a much wider range of issues 
beyond the purely economic (Clarke, 1994: 3-5), helping the poor was still largely 
missing from the mainstream literature (see, for instance, Sánchez and Corona, 
1993). However, over time not only the stated objectives of privatization evolved to 
incorporate a wider spectrum of economic, political and social issues, but the very 
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term “privatization” lost ground to other expressions such as “private sector 
participation” and, more recently, “public-private” or “tri-partite partnerships” 
(partnerships between the public sector, private providers, and “civil society”7). 
On the one hand, this was likely a response to the widespread controversies 
arising from what World Bank analysts already in the late 1980s termed the difficult 
and contentious business of privatization, in reference to the unexpected delays in 
implementation and the social and political conflicts associated with these policies 
(Nellis and Kikeri, 1989: 670). More recently, leading private operators involved in 
the implementation of mainstream WSS policies have been seeking to take distance 
from “privatization” and have proposed to avoid the term altogether, as illustrated by 
the following public statement by Mr Gérard Mestrallet, President-Director of the 
French water company Suez: 
we believe that the privatization of water infrastructures in developing 
countries is not necessary. […] The use of the term privatization made by 
some authors in their models while referring to situations where the public 
sector remains the final owner of the infrastructure constitutes an abuse of 
the language” (Mestrallet, 2001; see also Labre, 2004).  
 
These developments must be analysed in the light of the negative social and 
political processes associated with privatization programmes, including corruption 
scandals and growing citizen opposition. In the words of the former World Bank 
Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz, “in contrast to what it was supposed to do, 
privatization has made matters so much worse that in many countries today 
privatization is jokingly referred to as ‘briberization’” (Stiglitz, 2002: 58). Stiglitz 
gave among other examples the mass privatization programme implemented in 
Geoforum - ISSN: 0016-7185 
Special Issue on “‘Pro-poor’ water: past present and future scenarios” 
 
 
J E Castro 8
Russia, which he argued had increased poverty and inequality to unprecedented 
extremes (id. 153-5). These negative processes associated with privatization were 
particularly salient in the WSS sector worldwide, with many PSP projects being 
cancelled or aborted in Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the United States among 
other.8
On the other hand, perhaps these changes in the mainstream discourse also 
reflected a belated attempt at broadening the scope of privatization policies. In the 
WSS sector, claims that PSP would help to expand service access to the poor and 
improve social equity in developing countries became frequent in the mainstream 
literature since the mid 1990s. For instance, a World Bank policy document stated 
that “private participation offers enormous potential to improve the efficiency of 
infrastructure services [and] extend their delivery to the poor” (World Bank, 1998: 1; 
see also: Savedoff and Spiller, 1999; IDB, 1998). Leading officers from the 
mainstream institutions went on to claim that for PSP to succeed in helping the poor 
water provision should be in the hands of unregulated private monopolies. For 
instance, the World Bank Private Sector Specialist Penelope Brook Cowen has 
argued in favour of “laissez faire”, “complete privatization of water assets” and 
“unregulated private monopoly” to solve the situation of the water poor in 
developing countries (Brook Cowen and Cowen, 1998: 22-28). Although Brook 
Cowen’s views cannot be taken as representing the bank’s, as shown later there is 
evidence that facilitating unregulated PSP projects became a widespread practice 
during the 1990s. 
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Nevertheless, our main concern here is not the reasons behind the 
introduction of “pro-poor” arguments in mainstream WSS policies, but rather we 
want to explore the historical and empirical grounding of such arguments. In other 
words, what was the historical evidence informing the claim that promoting PSP 
would be the best instrument for reducing water poverty? What are the principles 
that provided the foundation for this claim? And, what has been the empirical record 
of the resulting WSS policies? 
 
Water business and the poor: an unlikely couple 
There is an increasing consensus that mainstream WSS policies have not been 
derived from a coherent theoretical framework. Although the claim about the 
superiority of private over public sector ownership and management has often been 
presented as grounded on rigorous economic theory, economic theory itself “fails to 
provide any conclusive reason for favouring private over public enterprise” 
(Commander and Killick, 1988: 320). However, authors sympathetic to the 
mainstream PSP model have repeatedly claimed that privatization would “bring 
substantial gains” (Lee, 1999: 101), allow “breaking with the increasing inefficiency 
circle” (Beato, 1997: 12) or that it would simply be “the most efficient form of 
organization” for WSS (Roth, 1988: 7). Moreover, some authors have also argued 
that expanding PSP would also help fostering “economic development and 
democracy in developing countries” (Dinavo, 1995: 2). The lack of a coherent 
theoretical ground for these assertions has led mainstream thinkers to blend 
arguments taken from, among other, free-market liberalism, management theory, 
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neo-classical price theory, public choice, and property rights theory in order to assert 
the superiority of the private sector over the public (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989: 663). 
This in itself can be acceptable, but the lack of a rigorous and consistent theoretical 
framework to support these arguments should be made more explicit in the 
mainstream literature. However, there is an even more important question that 
mainstream authors fail to address: what is the historical evidence to support their 
arguments? 
In historical perspective, the mainstream arguments are anchored in the 
principles of “privatism”, and particularly in the free-market Anglo-Saxon cultural 
tradition interwoven with the long-term development of the capitalist ethos, 
institutions, and doctrines. The privatist principles entail 
an assumption that the private sector is inherently dynamic, productive, and 
dependable; a belief that private institutions are intrinsically superior to 
public institutions for the delivery of goods and services; and a confidence 
that market efficiency is the appropriate criterion of social performance in 
virtually al spheres of community activity (Barnekov et. al., 1989: 1). 
 
There is a broad agreement in the literature that until the mid-nineteenth 
century the development of water supply services in the industrialized countries was 
largely inspired by this privatist ideal, particularly in England, France, and the 
United States. The prevailing understanding at the time that water services were only 
for those who could afford to pay for them led to the proliferation of relatively small, 
unregulated private water monopolies, normally operating in the largest and richest 
urban centres where ―with rare exceptions― they served mainly the wealthiest 
neighbourhoods and were reluctant to invest in extending the services to the poorer 
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sectors of the population (Goubert, 1986; Warner, 1987; Ward, 1997; Hassan, 1998; 
Ogle, 1999; Swyngedouw, 1999). This privatist approach to WSS was challenged 
since the late eighteenth century by a wide-ranging set of social and political forces, 
which particularly in Europe became amalgamated in the health and sanitation 
movement that campaigned for the universal expansion of hygiene and water. Their 
cause was helped by the threat of ninteenth-century epidemics, in particular cholera, 
which did not respect class boundaries in their ravages (Goubert, 1986: 103-9). 
An example in case is London where eight unregulated private water 
monopolies controlled the water supply services by the 1840s. As the nineteenth 
century progressed it became clear that the privatist assumptions of private sector 
inherent and superior dynamism, efficiency, and productivity had failed to 
materialize. The private companies were not expanding coverage to the poorest 
neighbourhoods, keeping quality standards, nor providing environmental protection. 
After protracted political struggles, in the long run water services were 
municipalized throughout the country while the London water companies were 
amalgamated and placed under public control in 1902.9 Also, the private sector in 
Britain was not attracted to such activities as river conservation or sewage collection 
and disposal, which were developed through public, mainly local, initiatives. The 
evidence shows that by the late nineteenth century it became accepted ―across the 
political spectrum― that universal access to safe WSS was a binding moral duty for 
the community which could not be left to unregulated private providers nor be 
subject to free-market principles (Laski et. al., 1935; Mukhopadhyay, 1975; Luckin, 
1986; Millward, 1991; Finer, 1997; Ward, 1997; Hassan, 1998; Castro et. al., 2003). 
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In the United States, by the mid nineteenth-century the privatist model of 
water services was also marred by technical and economic inefficiencies, expensive 
tariffs, and inadequate service standards. These problems, together with the risk 
aversion shown by private undertakers who were unwilling to invest in the expansion 
and improvement of the systems, led to the increased involvement of the public, 
mainly municipal authorities. Thus, while in 1806 about 94 per cent of water works 
were private by 1896 53 per cent had already been taken over or directly built by the 
public sector. Regarding sewerage systems, like in Britain these were almost 
exclusively a public sector endeavour (Keating, quoted in Hukka and Katko, 2003; 
see also Schultz and McShane, 1978; Warner, 1987; Ogle, 1999: 344; NRC, 2002).  
In France, private enterprise played a substantial role in developing an 
efficient water sector particularly since the creation around the mid nineteenth 
century of companies like Générale des Eaux, which became the first major French 
capitalist enterprise, and Lyonnaise des Eaux, among other. These companies 
succeeded in developing economically efficient water services for both domestic and 
industrial consumption. However, despite their achievements, by the late nineteenth 
century the bulk of water supply operations (serving about 75 per cent of local 
authority areas) were in the hands of municipal corporations, which on average 
provided water at about half the price of the private companies. Also, despite the 
efforts of the hygienists to make universalisation of WSS compulsory, until around 
the First World War the actual population connected to both public and private 
services was a small privileged and influential minority. Like in other cases, 
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wastewater collection and disposal in France was mostly a public sector initiative 
and responsibility (Goubert, 1986: 63-7; 101-5; 176-211). 
In Latin America, since the 1840s the development of water supply systems 
was influenced by the models emanating from Europe and the United States, with 
varying combinations of public (mainly municipal) and private participation. The 
main forms of private involvement were the concession of the services or the 
granting of building contracts to foreign companies, mainly British, French, US, and 
Canadian. By the early twentieth century the situation resembled the pattern of 
industrialized countries, where water services only reached selected neighbourhoods 
in the most important cities and private undertakers were reluctant or unable to 
expand the networks and improve quality standards. In a way similar to the European 
and US experiences, there was an increasing expansion of public sector involvement 
in WSS through the take over of most private utilities or in the direct development 
and expansion of the systems. Also, alternative forms of private initiative such as co-
operatives, mutual associations, and not-for-profit ventures became important actors 
in the development of WSS in the region.10
 
Regulation and the expansion of public sector intervention  
Since the late nineteenth century, the unsatisfactory unregulated private provision of 
goods and services derived from the laissez faire model, in the face of increasing 
public unrest, triggered the development of regulation of private activities. Liberal 
interpretations of this movement towards increasing regulation of economic and 
social life presented it as a sort of antiliberal conspiracy and an attack against 
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political democracy. However, the fact is that the social and political forces 
spearheading regulation in developed countries were wide ranging and included 
prominent liberals and convinced supporters of laissez faire (Polanyi, 1957: 144-
150). 
In Britain, formal regulation of public utilities developed in the form of 
contracts between municipalities and private providers which were granted rights for 
exploiting service monopolies such as gas and water in exchange for compliance 
with quality standards and price controls. However, the regulation of private 
monopolies proved to be inefficient, and eventually the solution adopted was the 
municipalization of the services (Foreman-Peck and Millward, 1994; Newbery, 
1999). In the US, since the 1870s the role of the judiciary in developing regulatory 
principles and institutions to protect the “public interest” and correct for imperfect 
competition was paramount. In relation to WSS, the Supreme Court produced 
cornerstone rulings determining that companies delivering public services are legally 
in the public domain, performing a state function, and therefore subject to regulation 
(USSC, 1877), that the public must be protected from unreasonable rates of return 
reaped by private water companies (USSC, 1904; also USSC, 1912), and that the 
information about how private water operators run their business must be in the 
public domain to allow citizen control over their operations (USSC, 1909). These 
and other landmark rulings contributed in the long run to the establishment of a solid 
regulatory tradition in the US and have continued relevance for contemporary WSS 
policies in the light of recent attempts at promoting unregulated WSS. 
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This development towards stricter regulation of private water monopolies 
was intertwined with the growing intervention of national states in the development 
of basic infrastructure, including public utilities (water, electricity, 
telecommunications), and in the provision of collective consumption goods that 
characterized the first half of the twentieth century (Swyngedouw et. al., 2002). In 
this context, the expansion of WSS became a matter of priority not only for reasons 
of hygiene or health but also for economic growth, attracting large-scale public 
subsidies. In some cases like Britain WSS became fully nationalized by the end of 
the Second World War, with the exception of a number of small private water supply 
operations (Goubert, 1986; Hassan, 1998). 
The mainstream post-war intellectual environment, largely influenced by 
Keynesian economics and broadly framed by social-democratic ideals, further 
strengthened this privileged role of the state as the key actor of economic 
development (McGowan, 1994; Brett, 2000). In the water sector, the process took the 
form of an increased centralization of WSS in the hands of national states, with the 
creation of powerful public bureaucracies such as the Bureau of Reclamation and the 
Corps of Engineers in the United States or the Secretariat of Water Resources in 
Mexico (Lee, 1999: 44). These bureaucratic apparatuses became largely dominated 
by experts in engineering, environmental science, and related fields, and played a 
key role in the development of the modern WSS sector. However, while in developed 
countries this state-led model was successful in achieving the universalisation of 
WSS, in most developing countries public sector performance has been rather 
disappointing in reducing WSS poverty and inequality. The substantive question 
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here, going back to the main concerns of this article, is what are the grounds to 
suggest that the solution to WSS poverty and inequality could be achieved through 
the expansion of private monopolies? Where has it happened before? Is it 
happening? 
 
Lessons from historical evidence: summing up 
It should not be surprising that mainstream WSS were not primarily targeted to 
reducing WSS inequality and poverty and that the inclusion of a “pro-poor” rhetoric 
was only a complementary element that was added to PSP programmes in the late 
1990s. In fact, the historical evidence does not provide support for the claim that PSP 
could be the main driver for the universalization of WSS, which in developing 
countries basically implies extending coverage to large sections of the population 
that cannot afford to pay even the full cost of WSS, let alone the price of 
commercially provided WSS. On the contrary, the historical evidence shows that 
profit-oriented PSP, especially if unregulated, tends to produce highly exclusionary 
and elitist outcomes, which are unlikely to benefit the poor. The World Bank has 
recently acknowledged that no country has been able to universalise essential 
services without strong public sector involvement and that PSP has problems 
“especially in reaching poor people” (2003: 10-1), but this was already accepted 
knowledge even among free-market liberals at the end of the nineteenth century. 
It is true that while in developed countries public intervention effectively led 
to the universalization of WSS in the second half of the twentieth century, 
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developing countries continue to lag well behind and inequality and poverty in the 
access to these services has been actually expanding in many cases. Why the 
argument that PSP would provide the solution to this problem has been so influential 
in shaping policy since the 1980s is still a controversial subject. Mainstream authors 
continue to offer a blend of free-market theory and an almost religious belief in the 
inherent superiority of the private sector over the public to defend their case. 
However, private sector actors seem to have a clearer answer than many theorists in 
relation to this problem: they acknowledge that their companies can only operate in 
conditions that ensure an adequate and sustained rate of return for their shareholders, 
and that this is seldom the case in developing countries, particularly in relation to 
serving the poor and very poor members of the population. As a recent analysis of 
the global water business put it: “can anyone imagine investing hard currency in 
water projects in countries like the Philippines, Argentina and Bolivia now?” (GWI, 
2004). The answer could have been anticipated from the historical evidence: 
multinational private water monopolies and the world’s poor were an unlikely couple 
from the start. 
We come back to this discussion later in the article but need now to approach 
the interrelation between mainstream WSS policies and the poor from another angle: 
these policies have profound implications for the democratic governance of water 
resources and WSS and for the exercise of substantive citizenship rights, especially 
by the most vulnerable sectors of society. 
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Governance, citizenship and the access to essential services 
 
There is a broad consensus about the need for effective water governance, based on 
active citizenship and participation, to achieve the universalization of essential WSS 
(ADB, 1995; UNDP, 1997; EC, 2002; GWP, 2003; Camdessus, 2003). However, this 
is a very fragile consensus because it has been built on the assumption that there is a 
shared understanding of the meaning and implications of “governance”, which in fact 
does not exist. According to the mainstream literature, governance systems are the 
result of the interaction between different management regimes: the classic forms of 
state authority (hierarchy), private management (market competition), and 
reciprocity (voluntary participation) (UNDP, 1997; Picciotto, 1997).  
Figure 1 
 
This understanding of governance is often idealistically portrayed as a 
balanced interaction between partners (Figure 1), a notion that underlies the concepts 
of “public-private partnerships” and “tri-partite partnerships” so often deployed in 
mainstream public policy. Unfortunately, this apparently shared understanding of 
governance obscures ongoing confrontations between rival theoretical bodies of 
knowledge and political and cultural traditions. For instance, “civil society”, one of 
the key partners according to mainstream authors, means radically different things 
for free-market liberals, communitarians, pluralists, or radical thinkers. While for 
free-market liberalism civil society is identical to the market, a space characterized in 
this intellectual tradition as the result of the free concurrence of self-interested 
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individuals, for pluralist and communitarian thinkers civil society is the realm of 
reciprocity and solidarity, a buffer space between the market and the state (Cohen 
and Arato, 1994). Likewise, while for the European social-democratic tradition 
access to basic services such as health or education is a “social right of citizenship”, 
this notion is absent in the free-market liberal tradition whereby citizenship is limited 
to the civil and political sphere and “consumer sovereignty” (Saunders, 1993) has 
preeminence over any notion of social rights (Marshall, 1992; Bulmer and Rees, 
1996). 
This is not just a matter of academic disquisition, as the contradictions 
between these intellectual and political frameworks are at the root of far reaching 
institutional and political transformations (King and Waldron, 1988; Fraser and 
Gordon, 1994; Leys, 2001), which we examine here in relation to WSS. For instance, 
free market liberals tend to consider state regulation of private activities to be an 
authoritarian practice that hinders rather than protects the rights of individual citizens 
(Zerbe Jr. and McCurdy, 2000). In this intellectual tradition, public regulation is 
deemed to be “inevitably inefficient” (Newbery, 1999: 386), markets are said to 
“find ways to mitigate their own failures” (Lee, 1999: 40), and consequently 
“unregulated private monopolies” are regarded as the best option for providing life-
sustaining services to the poor (Brook Cowen and Cowen, 1998: 22-3). 
The consideration of these conceptual cleavages is even more relevant when 
we address the case of developing countries, given that notions such as 
“governance”, “civil society”, and “citizenship” emerged from the specific historical 
experience of developed countries and their empirical reference is often absent in 
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other societies. For instance, going back to the notion of public-private and tripartite 
partnerships, in many developing and transition countries the expression is simply 
meaningless in practice. In many cases, this happens because the public sector is 
extremely weak and has a low capacity for regulation and law enforcement. Also, 
civil society is often a euphemism for a small elite that enjoys full access to the 
status of citizenship while the bulk of society cannot afford to participate 
meaningfully in the social and political life owing to protracted conditions of social 
inequality, poverty, and vulnerability (UN et. al., 1998; McGranahan et. al., 2001). 
These are not merely abstract speculations, as we have in mind here the 
evidence emerging from a number of case studies which we briefly consider in the 
next section. Owing to the limited scope of this paper, we have chosen cases from 
Argentina, Mexico, and England and Wales. A brief reference is also made to 
Bolivia. Some of our reflections are also based on our research on Brazil, Finland, 
Greece, Kenya, and Tanzania.11  
Argentina.  
Buenos Aires.12 In 1993, Aguas Argentinas (AA), a private consortium headed by 
the French company Suez (later Ondeo) was awarded a 30-year concession to 
provide WSS in Buenos Aires. Like most private concessions granted during the 
1990s in Argentina, this one was created by a special presidential “Decree of 
Necessity and Urgency” avoiding political debate, public consultation or citizen 
participation. Moreover, the concession was granted in the absence of any 
antimonopoly legislation, specific regulatory bodies or consumer representation. 
Successive renegotiations of the original contract, openly aimed at favouring the 
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private company’s interests over the public, were protected from scrutiny and even 
the belatedly created regulator ETOSS13 was excluded from a crucial contract 
renegotiation carried out between 1997 and 1999. 
AA was largely an unregulated monopoly between 1993 and 2001, when 
ETOSS was empowered to intervene more effectively. Meanwhile, the regulator and 
the users were dependent on the information released by the company, which left 
little room for independent assessment and monitoring. Moreover, the role of users’ 
organizations was only defined after the concession was granted and it was mostly 
limited to the right of presenting formal complains. After a long struggle to get 
connected to the network, poor people from neglected neighbourhoods overcame the 
resistance of the private company and were engaged as providers of labour and 
materials for the expansion of the network (UN-HABITAT, 2003: 176). 
There is little doubt that citizens and users were defenceless against the 
unchecked activities of AA. Thus, according to the regulator ETOSS, AA had a high 
level of non-compliance with the investments committed by contract: 42 percent on 
non compliance during 1993-98 and 33 percent during 1999-2002. Moreover, the 
company was allowed to raise the tariff by 88.2 percent between 1993 and 2002, 
compared to increases of 7.3 percent in the consumer price index during the same 
period. Unsurprisingly, these tariff increases affected especially the poor which 
contributed to the worsening inequality gap: in the Greater Buenos Aires, in 2004 the 
poorer 10 percent of the population spent in average 9 percent of their total income 
in the WSS bill, compared with 1.9 percent for the average consumer. In the mean 
time, between 1993 and 2001 the company obtained profit rates of between 13-20 
Geoforum - ISSN: 0016-7185 
Special Issue on “‘Pro-poor’ water: past present and future scenarios” 
 
 
J E Castro 22
percent over net assets in hard currency, compared with rates of between 6-12 
percent that are current in Europe or the US. 
Tucumán.14 The WSS in the northeastern province of Tucumán were granted 
in a 30-year long concession to Aguas del Aconquija (AAq), a consortium led by the 
French company Vivendi in July 1995. From the start, this case was marred by lack 
of transparency and corruption allegations. Like in Buenos Aires, citizens were 
excluded from the contract negotiation and there was no provision for user 
participation in the monitoring of the operation. However, the weak and 
undemocratic character of Tucuman’s WSS concession soon backfired and led to the 
early cancellation of the contract. 
First an increase of 106 percent in the water bills provoked widespread unrest 
among water users and prompted a “refusal to pay” campaign organized by a broad 
opposition front that included municipal authorities, provincial legislators, and 
former workers of the company. The campaign was heightened owing to problems 
with the quality of water being delivered and the protest movement grew rapidly to 
the point that 86 percent of the users, including businesses and the provincial 
government, joined in the civil disobedience. In 1997, AAq took the case to the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and sued the 
Argentinean government for a compensation of US$ 300 million. Shortly after the 
contract was terminated and the services resumed by the provincial utility. The case 
before the ICSID is still open at the time of writing this article (December 2005). 
It is fair to argue that Argentina in the 1990s provided the ideal experimental 
field for the market-centred model of governance relished by neoliberal thinkers: 
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private monopolies granted concessions and contracts in the absence of public debate 
and operating free from government regulation and citizen control. It should not be 
surprising then that between 1993 and 1999 the population served by private 
companies rose from 0 to 70 percent, an unprecedented case of PSP expansion in a 
developing country. Also unsurprisingly, and following the pattern observed 
elsewhere (UN-Habitat, 2003: 176), the poor did not rank high among the goals of 
the PSP projects implemented in Argentina. As the historical evidence suggests, in a 
laissez faire environment private water monopolies will try to expand their business 
to reliable and affluent customers not to the marginal areas of the cities. Tellingly, 
despite the accumulation of negative aspects in the case of AA, including the 
disastrous impact of the country’s financial collapse in 2001 on the operation and the 
mounting social and political conflicts surrounding it, as recently as in the World 
Development Report 2004 the World Bank was still praising this concession as a 
model to be followed (World Bank, 2003: 168). 
Mexico15
Despite the significant reduction of state control in the economy derived from the 
neoliberal programmes started in the mid 1980s, compared to the Argentinean 
situation in Mexico the public sector retained considerable control over the process. 
Also, in the early 1990s Argentina’s political system was in disarray and President 
Menem’s privatization policies went almost unchallenged for years, while in Mexico 
the opposition to privatization was comparatively very strong from the start. For 
instance, reforming the historic 1917 Revolutionary Constitution and passing a new 
Water Law in 1992 to enable mainstream PSP policies faced significant opposition in 
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Congress.16 The level of political confrontation was such that the federal government 
tried to defuse the critics by publicly denying that it was privatizing WSS, with 
senior officers like the Director of the National Water Commission appearing in the 
press to reassure the public that “water will not be privatized” (La Jornada, 1992: 
37). When the commercial aspects of the WSS in the Federal District (metering, 
updating the customer base, and billing) were contracted to multinational private 
monopolies in 1993, the employees of the private operators had to be disguised as 
officers of the public water authority owing to the rejection of PSP by the public. 
Undoubtedly, Mexico in 1993 was a very different playground for neoliberal policies 
than Argentina, although the Mexican executive itself was a keen advocate of 
neoliberalism and a strong promoter of PSP.17
Aguascalientes. The 20-year WSS concession in Aguascalientes, granted in 
1993 to a multinational private consortium (CAASA) led by the French group 
Vivendi, was the first long-term and comprehensive PSP project in Mexico. Shortly 
after the concession started, the 1994 financial crisis threatened the sustainability of 
the business, which would have required an increase of 170 percent in the tariffs, on 
top of several hikes applied during the first year. However, raising the tariff was 
deemed unfeasible by the authorities given that over two thirds of the customer base 
of the company were classified as low income. In the end, CAASA was rescued from 
bankruptcy in 1996 by the state, which provided an undisclosed amount of funding to 
free the private operator from its mounting debts. At the same time, the original 
contract obligations were renegotiated by reducing the investment commitments of 
the private company and transferring the bulk of investment in infrastructure back to 
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the public sector, while the concession period was extended to 30 years. The process 
took place in the absence of citizen or user involvement, whether in the original 
contract negotiation, in the renegotiation, or in the monitoring of the company’s 
performance. In Aguascalientes the regulatory duties are carried out by a 
decentralized municipal body, CAPAMA, which has the double role of granting 
power and regulator. In 1996 CAPAMA was a key actor in the controversial rescue 
package to save the private operator. 
The case of CAASA has also other illuminating facets in relation to the 
impact of PSP on water governance and citizenship. Traditionally the Mexican state 
has played a central role in structuring the relations between the private sector, 
labour unions, and popular movements in a corporatist political structure based on 
clientelism and paternalism (Knight, 1994; Whitehead, 1994). In particular, access to 
essential services such as WSS has been a favourite object of political clientelism. 
The 1992 sweeping reforms to the Constitution and the new Water Law were 
officially aimed at dismantling this clientelist model, and replacing it by a “new 
water culture” based on the transformation of right holders into customers, and 
fostering user participation in solving the problems affecting the water sector (CNA, 
1990: 16). In practice the situation has been far more complex, and Aguascalientes 
offers a good example: learning fast the old clientelistic tricks, CAASA has 
developed a tactic that can be called “private sector clientelism”. Every Wednesday, 
a representative of the company meets with users in the city’s main public square to 
discuss their grievances and problems, especially the non payment of bills. The event 
is called Citizen Wednesday and the evidence shows that the system has reproduced 
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the old clientelistic practices that the introduction of PSP was supposed to eradicate. 
Discounts are granted, interest rates applied to accounts in arrears are lowered, but 
the users interviewed perceive that these decisions are not taken on grounds of 
fairness, social equity concerns, or even rational planning but are rather subject to 
discretionary and subjective practices, which has created new problems and 
widespread dissatisfaction (Torregrosa et. al., 2003). 
Clearly, transforming deep rooted political cultures requires much more than 
institutional and legal reforms. Despite the explicit recognition of the need for public 
participation in the governance of water and WSS, in practice the model 
implemented in Mexico during the 1990s has not produced the much desired changes 
in the water culture. The prevailing notion of user participation is mostly limited in 
practice to the expectation that users would become obedient customers who pay 
their water bills punctually. This limited and instrumental notion of participation has 
been contested by the population, which continues to deploy a wide range of tactics 
from pacific bureaucratic demands and civil disobedience (e.g. non payment of water 
bills) to open and violent opposition by sabotaging water infrastructure (notoriously 
water meters), kidnapping water company employees, or destroying property. There 
remains a substantial hiatus between the formal recognition of participation as a 
citizenship right and the actual mechanisms available to citizens for expressing their 
grievances and preferences in relation to WSS policy (Castro, 2005; Castro et. al, 
2004b). 
Summing up, the contrast between Argentina and Mexico provides an 
excellent illustration of the particular expressions that the neoliberal model has taken 
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in different contexts. Undoubtedly, the neoliberal ideal of establishing a market-
centered model of governance of water and WSS free from regulation and controls 
met with a stronger political opposition in Mexico than in Argentina in the 1990s. 
This, however, does not mean that the Mexican public sector was in a much better 
position, technically or administratively, to exercise regulatory control over private 
operators. In this sense, the generalization made in the introduction about the chronic 
weakness of the public sector in developing countries to enter into meaningful 
partnerships with multinational private water monopolies remains valid in the 
Mexican case, as the public sector’s regulatory capacity has not been improved in the 
process (Torregrosa et. al., 2003: 47). In turn, Mexican civil society has been 
historically weak and subordinated to the state, although this situation has been 
changing rapidly since the late 1980s. Nevertheless, the capacity of the population to 
exercise their rights as citizens or even as customers continues to be very restricted. 
This helps to explain the persistence of non-civic forms of political opposition in 
Mexico, which are not just remnants of an authoritarian past but rather the traditional 
channels of public discontent and dissent. 
Bolivia18
It can be argued that Bolivia, one of the poorest countries in Latin America, was also 
identified by neoliberal policy makers as an ideal playground for their radical pro 
PSP reforms. Moreover, the concession granted in 1999 in Cochabamba to the 
private consortium Aguas del Tunari (AT) illustrates the pattern of political 
illegitimacy and disregard for the citizenry characterizing the implementation of 
mainstream WSS policies. The concession was negotiated in conditions of secrecy 
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whereby essential information such as the contractual obligations and the financial 
plans of the private operator were hidden from public scrutiny. According to the 
analysis, the process was also illegal because a) there was only one bidder and 
Bolivian law requires at least two; b) SISAB,19 the public body in charge of both 
granting and regulating the concession, was created in October 1999, after the 
contract with AT had been already started. Regarding the impact of this concession 
on the poor, the private company increased water bills by 35 percent (average), and 
the minimum charge came to represent almost 22 percent of the minimum wage. The 
prevailing perception among the population was that the regulator was protecting the 
interests of the private company, a feeling further accentuated when the municipality 
was left outside the negotiation over tariff increases, effectively curtailing the only 
institutional mechanism left available to the citizens. The concession was terminated 
in March 2000 as a result of massive public mobilizations that led to the withdrawal 
of the entire federal cabinet. AT has sued the Bolivian government before the ICSID 
to seek compensation, a case that also continues unsolved. 
England and Wales20
The privatization of WSS in England and Wales was implemented by the 
administration of Margaret Thatcher in 1989, as part of sweeping reforms to “roll 
back the state”. However, despite the neoliberal rhetoric in practice the 1989 
privatization brought about an unprecedented strengthening of the public sector’s 
regulatory capacities (Hogwood, 1998: 83). The original plan had been to minimize 
regulation, but this proved to be unfeasible in the increasingly complex conditions 
characterizing the governance of public services in Europe. In fact, a tight regulatory 
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structure was set in place driven by both national and European legislation. Although 
the situation is far from perfect (Schofield and Shaoul, 1997; Shaoul, 1998; 1998b), 
the private water monopolies in England and Wales are subject to much more 
stringent control than is the case in developing countries. 
Nevertheless, even in Europe the idealized understanding of governance as a 
balanced partnership does not stand the empirical test (Swyngedouw et. al, 2002b), 
as illustrated by the case of England and Wales. Although user participation in the 
monitoring of WSS was never a high priority, prior to the 1980s users were 
represented through their local authorities in the managing boards of the public water 
authorities. In 1983 this role of the local authorities in the governance of water 
utilities was cancelled by a legislative reform that led to the centralization of 
decision-making in the water sector, a situation that was maintained after the 1989 
privatization (Maloney and Richardson, 1995; Taylor, 1999). As a result, citizen 
participation in the monitoring of essential WSS continues to be severely restricted 
in practice. which during the 1990s became a major bone of contention owing to the 
widespread disappointment among the public with the privatized utilities.21
Among other issues provoking public unrest was the fact that WSS tariffs 
were increased well above inflation by an average 95 percent between 1989-99. 
Between 1990 and 1995 the number of pre-summons notices sent by the private 
companies to households in arrears rose by 900 percent, and in 1994 alone almost 2 
million households (about 9 percent of the total) defaulted on their water bills 
(Herbert and Kempson, 1995; Ward, 1997). The companies responded with a strict 
implementation of disconnection and other methods to punish non payment. Citizen 
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dissatisfaction was deepened by the private companies’ lack of compliance with 
investment programmes, extraordinary shareholder gains, and millionaire salary 
packages for top industry executives, which prompted a policy review after the 1997 
elections. As a result of the review, the private companies were required to reduce 
prices by 12 percent on average for 1999-2004 and to pay a windfall tax to 
compensate for excessive gains and non compliance with investment programmes. 
Disconnection was banned in 1997 as a result of strong political opposition to the 
practice, including pressures from high profile institutions like the British Medical 
Association. These decisions partly resulted from the substantial evidence showing a 
negative impact of privatization on the poor (Bakker, 2001; Drakeford, 2002). 
However, the impact on poverty and inequality worsened between 1998 and 2004 
measured by the rapidly increasing levels of consumer debt with the privatized 
utilities: 20 per cent of the households in England and Wales failed to pay their WSS 
bill in 2004. According to the government, in 2004 between 2 and 4 million 
households in England and Wales were leaving in “water poverty” (Klein [G], 2003; 
Fitch and Price, 2002; Greene, 2002; UKP, 2003; OFWAT, 2004: 14-19; NCC, 
2005). On the basis of the available evidence, it can be argued that mainstream WSS 
policies in England and Wales have contributed to reinforcing existing inequalities 
and poverty. 
 
Mainstream WSS policies in the balance 
The examples from the case studies presented above can be easily extended. There is 
enough evidence that the mainstream WSS policies have failed to contribute in 
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reducing WSS poverty (UN-HABITAT, 2003: 180-1), and our research suggests that 
there is strong support for the hypothesis that these policies have actually reinforced 
existing inequalities. In this regard, mainstream authors have insisted that PSP 
“produces net benefits for customers, investors, and countries” and would have 
“improved service quality and expanded coverage” in WSS (Rivera, 1996; see also 
Lee, 1999). The institutions at the forefront of these policies continue to argue that 
the notion that WSS are a “public service or even a social good” must be replaced by 
market-based provision and PSP (WSP-PPIAF, 2002: 8-10). However, World Bank 
analysts have also recognized that the impact of PSP in infrastructure provision on 
sustainable economic growth has been “unclear” (Alexander and Estache, 2000: 1), 
and that it has “mixed” results (Richard and Triche, 1994: 4). Others have also 
pointed out that “concern for the poor is by no means automatic” in the case of PSP 
projects, and that the institutional structures needed to exercise control over private 
providers and ensuring that they expand WSS to the poor “are often lacking in 
countries where the needs of the poor are greatest” (Smout, 1998: 150-1). The World 
Bank has recently acknowledged that though publicly-delivered essential services are 
often marred by problems “it would be wrong to conclude that government should 
give up and leave everything to the private sector” as PSP “is not without problems - 
especially in reaching poor people” (World Bank, 2003: 10-1). 
Nevertheless, these belated acknowledgements fall short of admitting the 
failure of mainstream WSS policies in relation to the poor. Thus, the fact that at the 
beginning of the 21st century the number of people lacking access to essential WSS is 
higher than in 1990 has been blamed, for instance, on “population growth” or “lack 
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of sustainability” rather than policy failure (WSP, 2003). Michael Klein, World 
Bank’s Vice President and Network Head of Private Sector Development, famously 
stated that “there was never an actual policy that said you shall privatize everything 
that moves, but some people interpreted it that way” (Klein [M], 2003), which does 
not help to persuade critics that the mainstream institutions are willing to make 
honest assessments of policy failures. Furthermore, some authors have argued that 
mainstream policies have been actually very successful in helping the poor, and that 
the problem is that the poor cannot recognize the beneficial effect of PSP in their 
lives. For instance, according to John Nellis, former Director of the Private Sector 
Development Department at the World Bank until 2000, in Latin America the poor 
are reaping the benefits of privatization but cannot see this because they would have 
been misled by anti-PSP campaigns launched by a network of academics, journalists, 
and militants who are winning the political war (Nellis, 2003: 17-9). However, 
Nellis’ assessment does not fit in easily with the increasing evidence showing that by 
the late 1990s Latin America had become the most unequal region of the world 
(IDB, 1998), a trend that has been confirmed recently by World Bank analysts (Perry 
et. al., 2003) and by studies of the specific case of water and sanitation services 
(Crenzel and Forte, 2004). It is also in open contradiction with other analysts who 
have found that mainstream PSP policies have contributed to rising inequality and 
poverty (Stiglitz, 2002: 79). 
From another angle, the evidence shows that mainstream PSP policies have 
substantially weakened the capacity of the public sector, especially local authorities, 
to effectively monitor private providers and have further alienated the citizenry from 
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participation in the democratic policy process. The 2004 World Development Report 
stated that “the only issue that really matters is whether the mechanism that delivers 
key services strengthens poor people’s ability to monitor and discipline providers, 
raises their voice in policymaking, and gets them the effective services they need for 
their families” (World Bank, 2003: 10-1). Very clearly, enabling this type of 
mechanisms has not been a high priority in the design and implementation of 
mainstream PSP policies. In fact, as discussed earlier, leading officers in charge of 
pro PSP policies inside the World Bank and other institutions have openly argued in 
favour of an unregulated or weakly regulated PSP model (e.g. Brook Cowen and 
Cowen, 1998). In the light of the case studies examined earlier,22 it can be argued 
that users’ ability to monitor and discipline private providers has been substantially 
weakened where it existed or altogether neglected, with few exceptions that tend to 
confirm the rule (Dourojeanni, 1999; Solanes, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002: 73). 
However, the expansion of the mainstream PSP policies has not taken place 
in a social vacuum, and has rather elicited strong reactions among the citizenry 
ranging from disappointment to outright contestation. For instance, recent evidence 
produced by a regular survey of public opinion in Latin America suggests that the 
already low acceptance of PSP policies among the public of the region has been 
worsening in recent years. Table 1 shows the results per country and also the total 
average for Latin America. 
 
Table 1 
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Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that this growing dissatisfaction with 
mainstream PSP policies in Latin America is also associated with an increasing 
disenchantment with the formal political system,23 which offers strong counter 
evidence to another claim made in the mainstream WSS literature: that the expansion 
of PSP would promote democratization in developing countries. In fact, the internal 
contradictions of the mainstream policies that have attempted to reorganize the 
governance of essential WSS around market principles while simultaneously 
claiming to pursue the goals of environmental sustainability, expanding services to 
the poor, and achieving democratic accountability are at the root of the failure 
experienced by PSP projects worldwide. Although there is an increasing recognition 
that these policies have not enhanced good governance and have rather discouraged 
citizen involvement and accountability, developing and replicating suitable 
alternatives will require radical changes in the form that multilateral institutions, aid 
agencies, and other key power holders approach this matter. There are worrying 
signs, however, that the efforts being made are too mean and half hearted to have the 
substantial impact needed to produce the expected changes in a system strongly 
shaped by the inertial forces set in motion by the neoliberal model. 
Although there are important lessons to be learned from the recent 
experience, and although the international financial institutions that have promoted 
these policies are now acknowledging the failure of centring the governance of 
essential public services purely on market principles, it is worrying that actual 
Geoforum - ISSN: 0016-7185 
Special Issue on “‘Pro-poor’ water: past present and future scenarios” 
 
 
J E Castro 35
mainstream policies in these sectors remain largely oblivious to much-needed 
changes in strategy. 
 
Conclusions 
There is a strong connection between eliminating unacceptable inequalities in the 
access to WSS and the achievement of substantive citizenship rights, such as the 
right to good health and to dignified living conditions but also the right to exercise 
control over how water resources and services are managed. For this reason, it is 
increasingly acknowledged that achieving success in universalizing essential services 
will require coordinated action at different levels (subsidiarity principle), with public 
participation by all sectors (active citizenship), and especially engaging the most 
vulnerable such as women and children who compose the bulk of the world’s poor 
(UN et. al. 1998; UNDP, 2003).  
At the global scale, the long-standing and increasing recognition of the urgent 
need for action has prompted renewed commitments from the international 
community, as represented by the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals 
(UN, 2000; 2002b). Also, and in acknowledgement of the moral character of the task 
ahead, access to safe water services has been recently enshrined as a human right in 
the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (UN, 2002; 
WHO 2003). More recently, at the 2003 G8 Summit, world leaders have pledged 
their support for poverty reduction programmes that prioritize “safe drinking water 
and basic sanitation” (G8, 2003). However, despite these laudable formal 
commitments there is an increasing recognition that achieving the international goals 
Geoforum - ISSN: 0016-7185 
Special Issue on “‘Pro-poor’ water: past present and future scenarios” 
 
 
J E Castro 36
for WSS may not be possible unless urgent decisions are taken, both in developed 
and developing countries. Not only the MDGs are considered by some experts to be 
technically unfeasible, but the financial arrangements needed to double the 
investments flows as required to meet the challenge would require far reaching 
transformations worldwide in the governance of water resources and WSS 
(Camdessus, 2003). In fact, a team monitoring the level of compliance with the 
MDGs has recently reported that the worst fears are being confirmed: not only 
progress is much slower than expected but it is also now clear that many poor 
countries will not achieve the goals (WHO, 2005: 27). 
One crucial obstacle for success is that, even if the political will needed to 
meet the targets existed, unfortunately current mainstream WSS policies, which have 
so clearly failed to promote good governance and the exercise of substantive 
citizenship rights, continue to commit efforts in the implementation of programmes 
that are largely blind to the needs, requirements, values, opinions, and preferences of 
people in developing countries, especially the most disadvantaged. It seems that the 
inertial forces set in motion by the neoliberal programme since the 1980s will 
continue to shape WSS policies in the foreseeable future. 
However, there are important lessons to be learnt from the success of WSS 
policies in developed countries during the twentieth century. The achievement of 
universal coverage was made possible by the adoption of policy principles whereby 
social rights and the common good were given priority over market interests. These 
policies and principles were supported at the time by a wide range of social and 
political forces, including sectors that in other respects defended free-market 
Geoforum - ISSN: 0016-7185 
Special Issue on “‘Pro-poor’ water: past present and future scenarios” 
 
 
J E Castro 37
liberalism but accepted that the extension of WSS to the poorest members of society 
required different arrangements. It is our hypothesis that achieving success in the 
design and implementation of present and future WSS policies as those required to 
meet the MDGs can only be achieved through the amalgamation of a similarly broad 
and universalistic set of social forces, not just composed by the illuminated elites but 
also able to incorporate the large sectors currently excluded or marginalized. The 
good news is that these processes are already taking place, however imperfect or 
limited they might be. Critically supporting them and contributing to their 
multiplication and expansion is an intensely political endeavor. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Institutional Options for Water and Sanitation Services 
With 
management 
contract
With service 
contract
Corporatized and 
commercialTraditional
User or 
community 
provision (“self-
help”)
Private (including 
cooperative) 
ownership and 
operation
Concession 
contract
Lease 
contract
Public enterprise
Government 
department
OPTION D
Community/
user 
provision
OPTION C
Private 
ownership, 
private 
operation
OPTION B
Public ownership, 
private operation
OPTION A
Public ownership and operation
 
Source: World Bank (1994) 
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Table 2. Forms of Private Sector Participation in Water and Sanitation Services 
 
FULL DIVESTITURE  
Full transfer of assets to private sector through asset sales, share sales or management 
buyouts. Private sector responsible for all capital investment, maintenance, operations 
and revenue collection.  
PARTIAL DIVESTITURE  
Government (or any public owner) sells a proportion of shares in an incorporated 
enterprise or creates a new joint venture company with the private sector.  
CONCESSION  
Government lets a long-term contract, usually over 25 years, to a private company, 
which is responsible for all capital investment, operations and maintenance.   
LEASE  
Long-term contract (usually 10-20 years but can be longer). Private sector responsible 
for operations and maintenance and sometimes for asset renewals. Assets remain in 
public sector and major capital investment remains a public responsibility.  
BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) / BOO (Build-Operate-Own) 
Contracts are issued for the construction of specific items of infrastructure, such as a 
bulk supply reservoir or treatment plant. Normally, the private sector is responsible for 
all capital investment and owns the assets until transferred to the public sector, but in 
BOO schemes, private ownership is retained.  
MANAGEMENT CONTRACT  
Short-term contracts, typically five years. Private firm only responsible for operations 
and maintenance.  
SERVICE CONTRACT- [BUYING IN]  
Single function contracts to perform a specific service (e.g. install meters) for a fee.  
 
 
    Source: Seppälä and Hukka (2004). 
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       Box 1. Key principles of neoliberal water policy extracted from 
                   the mainstream literature 
 
a) Water resources should be allocated through the market; that is, private water rights 
should be created replacing any existing forms of collective or public rights and they should 
be freely tradable; 
b) Water services have to be considered an economic good, in the sense of being a private 
good that has to be bought in the market; by definition, once WSS are considered to be 
private goods, non payers can be excluded from accessing them; the notion that WSS are a 
public or social good must be abandoned; 
c) Water services should be provided by private operators, which are inherently more 
efficient than public ones; if possible, water services should be self regulated by market 
mechanisms and state intervention should be minimized if not altogether cancelled; 
d) Water services are not a natural monopoly, as claimed by the defenders of state 
intervention; most operations can actually be opened to competition, perhaps with the 
exception of some core activities; however, high transaction costs can make competition 
difficult; in these cases, a privately-owned water monopoly is preferable to a public one; 
even then, keep regulation to a minimum or cancel it altogether if possible; 
e) Water users should be transformed into consumers, and right holders into customers. 
Source: Castro (2005), chapter 6 (see also: 
www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/j.e.castro/WPCAppendix.pdf).  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1 
The ideal-type model of governance
State
(hierarchical order)
Market (self-
organization driven 
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Adapted from Picciotto 
(1997)
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1. Evolution of public support for PSP in Latin America* (1998-2003) 
                     1998           2002          2003 
 
Costa Rica  60  32    - 
Brazil   51  38  33 
Venezuela  51  38  32 
Mexico  49  28  31 
Chile   51  22  29 
Honduras  47  34  25 
Colombia  39  23  24 
Paraguay  46  19  23 
Peru   44  32  22 
Ecuador  52  40  20 
Nicaragua  46  30  20 
Bolivia  49  23  19 
Guatemala  62  29  16 
Uruguay  29  16  16 
El Salvador  54  35  15 
Argentina  32  14  12 
Panama  20  31  10 
    
Latin America  46  28  22 
 
 
Source: Lagos (2004). 
 
* Percentage of positive responses to the question: “Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each of the following phrases that I am going to read: 
The privatization of state companies has been beneficial to the country.” The table only shows results 
for the responses “Strongly Agree” and “Somewhat Agree”. 
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Endnotes 
  
 
1 We mean the policies of deregulation, liberalization, and privatization that have been the priority of 
the international financial institutions (e.g. World Bank), aid agencies (e.g. USAID), and OECD 
countries and that have been implemented in the water sector worldwide since the 1980s, often 
referred to as “neoliberal”. We also refer as “mainstream” to the academic and professional literature 
where the process of governance of natural resources and essential public services has been 
conceptualized in a way that justifies the subordination of socio-political and ecological concerns to 
the requirements of capitalist accumulation. We are aware, though, that there are different approaches 
within this broadly defined mainstream body of thought and policy, and that there is no monolithic 
position even within the institutions that have been at the forefront of these policies. See Appendix 
Box 1 for a reference to the key neoliberal WSS policy principles, a topic which is further explored in 
Castro (2004b; 2005). 
2 In relation to water, and environmental goods and services generally, commodification can be 
defined as the process by which relations between human beings and the natural environment become 
increasingly transformed into market transactions and the elements of nature converted into tradable 
commodities for private profit. 
3 Although for many experts in the field the use of “monopoly” in relation to WSS would be 
redundant (they would be a natural monopoly), this is a contested terrain and many authors have 
argued that in fact most WSS operations are not a natural monopoly and are in principle amenable to 
market competition (see, among others, Newbery, 1999; Lee, 1999). 
4 As shown in Table 1 of the Appendix, there are different PSP options (columns B, C, and D). Our 
analysis here focuses on cases that fall under options B and C, but does not include option D. Also, as 
illustrated in Table 2 of the Appendix, the specific implementation of PSP can take different forms 
ranging from limited service contracts to full divestiture, which have very different policy 
implications that cannot be addressed here for reasons of space and scope. For a more detailed 
analysis of the institutional options for PSP in WSS see, for instance, Hukka and Katko (2003); 
Seppälä and Hukka (2004). We also assume here that the mainstream PSP model implies in principle 
that the private utilities are financially self-sufficient and not reliant on state subsidies for delivering 
the services, which are provided on a commercial basis. 
5 The MDGs envisage halving the proportion of the world’s population without access to WSS by 
2015 and providing universal access to these services by 2025 (UN 2000; 2002b). 
6 There is no consensus about the quantitative expression of such concepts as WSS poverty. However, 
there are international standards recommended for water supply which suggest a minimum of 40-50 
litres of water per capita per day. In this regard, it is estimated that over1 billion people (17% of the 
world population) have no access to safe drinking water supplies and over 2 billion people (40%) lack 
basic sanitation services (EC, 2003). 
7 I use inverted commas to indicate the problematic character of the meaning of “civil society”, which 
is at the base of much confusion and ambiguity permeating the mainstream literature on the topic. We 
address this issue in more detail in later sections.    
8 See, for instance, Savedoff and Spiller (1999); PSIRU (2005); Castro (2004b). 
9 However, in England and Wales there are a number of statutory private water supply companies, 
mostly small operations some dating back several centuries, which have survived until today. They 
served around 25 per cent of the population in the late 1980s, but most of them have been absorbed 
during the 1990s by the large privatized companies created in 1989. 
10 See, for instance: for Argentina: Catenazzi and Kullock, 1997; for Mexico: Connolly (1997), 
Aboites Aguilar (1998); Pérez-Rincón (2002) for Colombia; Swyngedouw (1999), for Ecuador; 
Rezende and Heller (2002), for Brazil. 
11 See Vargas (2003), Seppälä et. al., (2003), Kallis, 2003, Nyangeri (2003), and Mashauri (2003). 
Also, we are concerned here with issues of governance and citizenship, from a social science 
perspective, and therefore we do not address other relevant aspects of the case studies such as 
economic and financial performance or infrastructure efficiency of the private operators. These and 
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other important aspects have been covered elsewhere: Azpiazu and Schorr (2004); Torregrosa et. al. 
(2004). 
12 The section on Buenos Aires is based on Azpiazu et. al. (2003); Azpiazu and Schorr (2004). 
13 Tripartite Entity of Sanitation Works and Services. 
14 The section on Tucumán is based on Crenzel (2003). 
15 The section on Mexico is based on Torregrosa et. al. (2003) and Castro (2004; 2005). 
16 The law was passed only after over 30 amendments to the original text. 
17 See, for instance, Rogozinski (1993; 1998). 
18 This section is based mainly on Crespo et. al. (2003). This is a brief reference to Bolivia, a case 
covered in greater detail elsewhere in this issue. 
19 Superintendence of Basic Sanitation. 
20 This section is mainly based on Castro (2003; 2004c). 
21 Participation has been mainly limited to the activities of Customer Service Committees (CSCs),  
which formed the Ofwat National Consumer Council,  replaced in April 2002 by “WaterVoice” and a 
Consumer Council for Water (CCW). The change, according to a parliamentary report, was 
introduced “to achieve a higher public profile among water consumers, the media and other interested 
bodies and clearer separation from Ofwat” (UKP, 2003b). This report includes very illuminating 
paragraphs about the restricted character of citizen participation in the running of England and 
Wales’s water and sanitation services, even after the change introduced in 2003 to improve it. For 
instance, the report adds: “In some areas the powers proposed in the Bill fall short of what experience 
tells us is required. For example, the CCW must be able to obtain information from the water 
companies. But in the event of a refusal the Water Bill provides for Ofwat to decide whether the water 
company should be ordered to supply the information requested from it by the CCW. Ofwat will also 
be able to decline to supply information requested from it by the CCW. A further example is that 
Ofwat will not be subject to a statutory duty to consult and take account of the CCW's comments in 
the regulatory decision-making process” (id.). This is of the utmost relevance, as the report itself 
illustrates when considering a recent decision by the regulator: “we had reservations about Ofwat's 
handling of a consultation last year on an important proposal to extend the minimum period of notice 
to terminate a water company's licence from 10 to 25 years. Initially the consultation, limited to an 
eight week period, took the form of a statutory public notice with little supporting information. Fuller 
information was provided when we asked for it. Before public consultation Ofwat had consulted and 
obtained the agreement of Ministers to the proposal and Ministers' agreement was made public at the 
start of the consultation. We believe that this gave the impression that the outcome of the consultation 
was a foregone conclusion. Ofwat has said that circumstances of this particular consultation were 
exceptional and are unlikely to be repeated. We hope very much that this will prove to be the case, 
and that this consultation will serve as a reminder of how regulatory accountability can sometimes fall 
short of customers' expectations” (id.). See also de la Motte (2005), pp. 25 and ff.  
22 We can add a number of similar cases from our research such as Limeira, Niterói and the Lakes 
Region in Brazil (Vargas, 2003), Athens (Kallis, 2003), Nyeri and Tala in Kenya (Nyangeri, 2003), 
and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania (Mashauri, 2003). For a comparative analysis of case studies in 
Africa, Europe and Latin America, see Castro and Laurie (2004), especially Section 3.2 “The 
unregulated monopoly”.  
23 According to the Latinobarómetro survey, between 1996 and 2003 there has been a decrease in the 
support for democracy in 14 out of the 17 countries covered by the study. Among the countries 
mentioned in the case studies here the figures were: Argentina from 71 percent in 1996 to 58 percent 
in 2003; Bolivia, from 64 percent to 50 percent; Mexico has remained stable at 53 percent (Lagos, 
2004). 
